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Abstract
We propose to evaluate Lei do Bem (law 11.196/05) for 
Brazilian regions (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast 
and South). This is the first study that analyzes Lei do Bem 
using extensive game simulations for the different regions 
of the country. Based on data from 2006 to 2015, we find 
moral hazard between government and innovative Brazilian 
companies, as there was no express incentive in the Lei do 
Bem to stimulate the industrial sector to innovate and re-
gister the innovation as a patent. Thus, policies that review 
the tax incentives structure contained in the Lei do Bem as 
well as encourage industries and companies to file patents 
in public patent databases may have positive effects on the 
Brazilian innovation system.
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Análisis de los incentivos fiscales brasileños 
a la innovación y los datos de patentes:  
un enfoque desde el modelo  
del agente-principal
Resumen
Nos proponemos evaluar la Lei do Bem (ley 11.196/05) 
para las regiones brasileñas (Norte, Nordeste, Centro-Oeste, 
Sudeste y Sur). Este es el primer estudio que analiza la Lei do 
Bem utilizando simulaciones de juegos extensos para las dife-
rentes regiones del país. A partir de los datos de 2006 a 2015, 
encontramos riesgo moral entre el gobierno y las empresas 
innovadoras brasileñas, ya que no había ningún incentivo 
expreso en la Lei do Bem para estimular al sector industrial a 
innovar y registrar la innovación como patente. Por lo tanto, 
las políticas que revisan la estructura de incentivos fiscales 
contenida en la Lei do Bem, así como el estímulo a las indus-
trias y empresas para registrar patentes en las bases de datos de 
patentes públicas, pueden tener efectos positivos en el sistema 
de innovación brasileño.
Palabras clave: Lei do Bem, innovación, datos de pa-
tentes, Modelo de Agente-Principal.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, incentives for innovation in the form of tax incentives have beco-
me an international trend. Such countries, mainly more technologically advanced 
countries, namely Canada, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, have 
used tax incentives to stimulate innovation and R&D since the 1970s. These coun-
tries began discussing standardization of incentives for innovation with the Frascati 
Manual in 1963.1 The Manual was extremely important for understanding the role 
of science and technology in economic development. The definitions set out therein 
are internationally accepted to this day, and set a common language for discussion of 
scientific and technological policies, as well as standardizing incentive mechanisms 
to encourage investment and execution of R&D activities, such as fiscal incentives 
(Barbosa et al., 2013).
Although far from perfect, these incentives have some advantages that make 
them attractive to policymakers: (i) they are based on market allocations, as the 
decision-making process regarding the development of innovation and the amount of 
expenditure is firm; ii) do not discriminate between sectors; and iii) are readily availa-
ble to companies, with low administrative costs for the government. (CORDER, 2006).
In this context, according to Clemente and da Silva (2017), Brazil belatedly 
reformulated in 2004 and 2005 its institutional apparatus for innovation, to approach 
OECD conventions and the Frascati Manual. The Innovation Law (2004) and the Lei 
do Bem (2005) reduced some institutional barriers to innovation, provided incen-
tives for university-business cooperation, and modified access to tax incentives for 
innovation. Chapter III of the Lei do Bem (Law No. 11.196/05) is currently the most 
comprehensive tax incentive stimulating innovation. It complies with the determina-
tion of the Innovation Law (Law 10.973/04), which establishes that the Government 
should foster innovation in companies or industries by granting tax incentives. The 
law simplified the bureaucratic procedure by not requiring pre-approval of projects 
or participation in bidding processes (Zucoloto, 2008). As a result, when the law 
came into effect, in 2006, 130 firms used tax incentives for innovation, 320 in 2007 
and 552 in 2008. Although this number is on the rise, it is still small, if we consider 
there are around six thousand firms conducting research and development (R&D) 
activities in Brazil (Araújo, 2009).
1 OECD Expert met with the NESTI (National Experts on Science and Technology Indicators) group in the city 
of Frascati, Italy, presenting as a result of their work the first version of the Frascati Manual, known as "The 
Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development", aiming to standardize 
the methodology for the development of Research and Development.
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However, according to Zucoloto (2008), the Lei do Bem has some obstacles. 
One of these is in the percentages of tax incentives provided to companies. These 
percentages reveal a significant sectorial correlation between R&D expenditure by 
large companies and R&D expenditure of companies that accessed the Lei do Bem, 
achieving a correlation of 95.8% in 2008. These results are important in investi-
gating the Law's ability to stimulate private R&D investment. Preliminary analysis 
suggests that this instrument has not yet been able to stimulate sector diversification 
of these investments in Brazil, as its benefits are mostly captured by sectors that 
already carried out this activity. One of the causes may be the existence of moral 
hazard2 between the government and beneficiaries of the Lei do Bem. Moral hazard 
applies to behavior after the institutionalization of law, in which a party has private 
information which it can use to take advantage of the prejudice of the other party.
Several studies indicate that the Lei do Bem is a promising instrument since 
the number of companies and incentive volume has increased since its creation. 
However, they only concentrated in the post-concessionary relations of the incen-
tives, both by public agents, who cannot control how the use of tax benefits occurs, 
but also by the private sector, which is not encouraged to expend much effort in the 
phenomenon of innovation.
Thus, the purpose of assessing the presence of moral hazard regarding the Lei 
do Bem, from 2006 to 2015, period that the law was in effect, using the theoretical 
approach known as Principal-Agent3 arises. This procedure has been a recurring 
theme abroad since the early 1980s but has little approached in Brazil. Studies 
involving this approach are becoming increasingly important since it reduces the 
asymmetry of information that exists in the most diverse businesses.
Within the scope of the Brazilian innovation system, we are not aware of any 
studies that show the presence of a moral hazard or opportunistic behavior on the 
part of the beneficiary companies. We know that there are distortions between the 
real purpose of the law and its application, which encourages us to investigate the 
2 The concept of moral hazard refers to the possibility of an agent changing its behavior according to the different 
contexts after the establishment of a rule or a law. That is asymmetric information, a situation in which one party 
in the transaction has more information than the other. The principal-agent problem is a special case of moral 
hazard, in which one party, the agent, acts in the interest of the other party, the principal. The agent may have 
an incentive or tendency to act inappropriately from the principal's point of view if the interests of the agent 
and principal are not aligned. The agent usually has more information about his actions or intentions than the 
principal, because the principal usually cannot perfectly monitor the agent (Clemente and Silva Júnior, 2012).
3 The Principal-Agent problem is characterized by a Principal inducing (using a legislative act) an Agent to 
follow certain rules. The problem of the Principal is to designate, under the law, a "pay-off" that encourages 
the Agent to act in the best possible way (MAS-COLELL, 1995).
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causes of such distortions. This study, then, is pioneering in evaluating the presence 
of moral hazard in the Lei do Bem from the perspective of the Principal-Agent model.
To measure the impact of tax incentives on innovation by companies that have 
accessed the Lei do Bem, we used the patents database4 by the National Institute of 
Intellectual Property (INPI). Patent statistics, even in countries with well-established 
databases such as the United States, have countless limitations as indicators of te-
chnological activities (Albuquerque, 1996). Cohen & Levin (1989) stress how "the 
economic value of patents is highly heterogeneous" (p.1063). Despite these and 
other limitations, Griliches (1990) completed a comprehensive "survey" on the 
subject stating that "despite all the difficulties, patent statistics remains a unique 
and solid source for analyzing the process of technological change" (p.1702). Other 
researchers analyzed several other mechanisms used to measure the impact of tax 
incentives on innovation activities. (Freeman, 1982; Andersen et al., 2002; Tether, 
2003; Kannebley Júnior et al, 2016; Blind et al, 2018).
In the case of Brazil, the alternative database to the patent bank is the National 
Survey of Innovation (PINTEC) by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE). However, there are also countless limitations which, for this study, are im-
practicable, especially the main ones: i) the research is triennial, which limits the 
evaluation of the Lei do Bem from year to year; and ii) in PINTEC, companies do not 
declare individual access to the benefits offered by the Lei do Bem, which makes it 
impossible to extract the object of this research (companies benefitting from the 
Lei do Bem from 2006 to 2015) from the database. Thus, the filing of patents per 
company as a proxy for innovation is more appropriate to the study.
This article has four sections. In addition to this introduction, we present the 
theoretical framework followed by the methodology and source of the data, as well 
as the results, discussions, and final considerations.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Schwartz (1992) observes that public or private instruments (contracts, equivalent 
documents, laws, legislative acts, etc.) are inevitably incomplete when one of the 
4 A patent is a title of ownership over an invention or utility model, it may be a product or process. This title 
grants to the inventors the rights of the creation, to protect the products or the process, in which time and 
resources were invested, against the copy or commercialization of the holder's authorization (Pereira, 2003).
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parties has a condition or information that is not observable by one or both parties, 
or a non-verified condition "ex-post".
It is noteworthy that, according to the literature, these instruments are incom-
plete due to the presence of uncertainty (limitation in predicting all future conditions 
in a relationship) and opportunism.
Uncertainty occurs because, no matter how much the human being tries to do 
their best, because of cognitive limitations, they will not achieve this. Opportunism, 
however, occurs due to the predisposition of individuals to maximize their utility 
(NASCIMENTO, 2007).
Thus, the instruments of interest deal with two types of situations: adverse 
selection (opportunistic behavior before the instruments) and moral hazard (op-
portunistic behavior after the instruments). These phenomena may affect the right 
of the results sought by the parties involved in the transaction (COSTA, 2008).
According to Salainié (2002), moral hazard is an information problem, lack of 
alignment of interests, different levels of knowledge for delegation, and difficulties 
to observe the levels of effort of economic agents. Varian (1999) establishes that 
moral hazard is due to the lack of economic incentives.
And one way to evidence the presence of moral hazard is by using the con-
cepts of the principal-agent theory. Thus, both the principal and the agent take this 
behaviour (LAFFONT, 2002).
Varian (1999) points out that to alleviate the problems of moral hazard be-
tween the agents and the principal, one must monitor their activities and establish 
economic incentives. The principal should monitor based on proxies that objectively 
present the level of effort of the agent. Incentives should encourage the agent to act 
in a manner close to what was established in the negotiation. To understand the 
problem of moral hazard it is necessary to study Principal-Agent modeling. Thus, 
the Principal wants to choose a function(s) that maximizes its utility, subject to the 
constraints imposed by the Agent's optimization behavior, of which there are two: i) 
Participation Restriction (RP)5 and Incentive Compatibility (RCI)6 (SAMPAIO, 2007).
5 Represents the Agent's decision to agree whether or not to follow the law proposed by the Principal, according 
to its level of utility
6 The Principal offers an incentive scheme capable of inducing the Agent to choose to act as it wishes.
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According to Clemente and Silva Júnior (2013), based on Laffont (2002), the 
general formulation of the Principal-Agent is for two players, considers A= set of ac-
tions by the agent; S= set of possible results. The agent takes actions “a” belonging to 
set, A = {a1, a2,..., aN} which produces a result “s” of set S =  {s1, s2,..., sM} and occur 
with a specific probability: πn1, πn2, ..., πnM, so that  ∑ =1 = 1.  
Thus, for each action "a" belonging to set A, we have a probability distribu-
tion ∏A in S. If w is the value paid for the service, we assume that w is a function w: 
S → R. This is , if "s" is observed, the principal pays w(s) to the agent, i.e., the agent's 
compensation is determined by the result of its actions.
For the principal, a pair of "a" and "s" results in an income B (a,s) and, conse-
quently, the principal’s profits are given by: B(a, s) - W(s). Thus, the expected profits 
of the principal can be written as:
Expected return =  ∑ ( ( , ) −  ( ))=1            [1]
The profit of the principal is the result produced by the agent's action less 
what is paid to the agent for the services rendered.
For the agent, a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u(w,a), is assumed. 
Considering that each agent has other alternatives that provide it with its utility 
reserve, it agrees to participate in the negotiation proposed by the principal if the 
inequation (2) is verified:
Expected utility = ∑ ( ( ), ) ≥=1             [2]
That is, participation restriction (RP) is satisfied when its expected utility of 
the chosen action (an) is greater than or equal to the expected utility of the other 
available actions.
In addition, the principal induces the agent to take action that maximizes 
its expected profits, satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint (RCI). For the 
chosen action an:
∑ ( ( ) −  ( )  ≥ =1 ∑ ′ ( ( )) − ( ′) =1           [3]
in which
n’ = 1...N
d is the wear or disutility resulting from the execution of an action.
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Thus, for each w and each an action, we have a payoff (pair of results for the 
principal and agent, respectively) of:
∑ ( ( , ) −  ( ))=1 ; ∑ ( ( ), ) ≥=1             [4]
Figure 1 shows how to solve this game by means of balancing in Perfect 
Subgame, that is, solving the game from back to front. In the last stage, the agent 
chooses its action an, in order to respect the RCI; then it is observed whether its 
utility is greater than its expected utility (RP; finally, the negotiation that the prin-
cipal proposes [the pair w(s) and s] given the agent's choices, so that the principal’s 
revenue is maximized).
Figure 1. General form of a Principal-Agent game
















 N s 
a 









 According to Hall and Lerner (2009), within the R&D setting, the deviated 
data issue alludes to the truth that an innovator as often as possible has superior 
data approximately the probability of victory and the nature of the mulled over 
development extend than potential financial specialists. Hence, the commercial 
center for financing the advancement of innovative ideas looks just like the “lemons” 
showcase (Akerlof, 1970). The ‘lemons' premium for R&D will be higher than that for 
conventional speculation since financial specialists have more trouble recognizing 
great ventures from terrible when the ventures are long-term R&D speculations 
than when they are more short-term or low-risk ventures (Leland & Pyle, 1977). 
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When the level of R&D consumption could be an exceedingly discernible flag, because 
it is beneath current U.S. and U.K. rules, we might anticipate that the lemons' issue 
is to some degree moderated, but certainly not disposed of (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 
1983; Anton & Yao, 2002). In this way the suggestion of hilter kilter data coupled with 
the expensiveness of mitigating the issue is that firms and creators will confront a 
better taken a toll of outside than inner capital for R&D due to the lemons’ premium.
A few experimental bolster for this suggestion exists, generally within the 
shape of occasion considers that degree the advertise reaction to declarations of 
unused obligation or share issues (see: Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Cho, 1992; Francis 
& Smith, 1995; Johnston & Rao, 1997; Majumdar & Nagarajan, 1997; Pugh, Jahara, & 
Oswald, 1999; Eng & Shackell, 2001). Both Alam & Walton (1995) and Zantout (1997) 
discover higher irregular returns to firm offers taking after modern obligation issues 
when the firm is more R&D-intensive. The contention is that the procurement of 
unused sources of financing is nice news when the firm has a hilter kilter data issue 
since of its R&D technique. So also, Szewcxyk, Tsetsekos, & Zantout (1996) discover 
that speculation opportunities explain R&D-associated irregular returns which these 
returns are higher when the firm is exceedingly utilized, inferring a better required 
rate of return for obligation back in harmony.
In spite of the fact that the prove summarized over is decently clear and shows 
that long term motivations for supervisors can empower R&D which organization 
possession does not essentially dishearten R&D speculation, it is decently noiseless 
on the size of these impacts, and whether these administration highlights really near 
the office cost-induced crevice between the fetched of capital and the return to R&D.
LEI DO BEM7
Until the introduction of the Lei do Bem, the policy of tax incentives for innovation 
followed the provisions of Law 8.661/93, which represented the resumption of the 
mechanism a technological policy instrument in Brazil. The obtaining of tax incen-
tives was conditional on the execution of Industrial and Agricultural Technological 
Development Programs (PDTI and PDTA) by the companies.
7 The explanations about the Lei do Bem and its consequences were taken from the text by Araújo (2009), 
called Tax Incentives for Research and Development and Innovation Costs in Brazil, due to its excellent and 
competent synthesis, as well as the robust explanation of the tax incentives offered by such law.
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In this line, the Ministry of Science and Technology or federal and state agen-
cies and entities for technological development or research that are accredited by 
the Ministry for the exercise of this assignment should approve PDTIs and PDTAs. 
The complexity of these forms was considered one of the main obstacles to the use 
of the instrument (MATESCO and TAFNER, 1996).
In 1997, the incentives of Law 8.661/93 changed, essentially related to a 
significant reduction of the percentages involved. Subsequently, modifications in-
cluded the authorization of granting an economic subsidy to companies engaged 
in said programs (Law 10.322/01) and, at the same time, the extension of existing 
incentives (Law 10.637/02).
The changes brought by the Lei do Bem (Law No. 11.196/05) made the use of 
tax incentives much simpler and more direct. As a result, more firms began to use 
them, especially due to eliminating the need for prior authorization.
The main change introduced by the Lei do Bem was the deductibility of R&D ex-
penses at the ratio of 1.6 of the tax base, eliminating the tax credit-based mechanism. 
With this, the Lei do Bem ended any kind of restriction on the usufruct of tax credits.
The following are the three incentives related to income taxes introduced by 
the Lei do Bem:
i. Current spending on R&D activities could be deducted from the IRPJ (Legal 
Entity Income Tax) and CSLL (Social Contribution on Net Income) taxes 
base at the rate of 160%. This rate increases by 20% if the company raises 
the number of researchers by more than 5%, and increases by 10% if the 
company raises the number of researchers by up to 5%. The rate could 
also be increased by 20% if the firm had a patent granted. However, since 
the average time between application for registration and the granting of 
a patent is eight years, patents end up being related to past technological 
efforts
ii. As with the PDTI and PDTA, the rate of depreciation of investments in ma-
chinery and equipment for innovation could be accelerated in two parts, 
but only for purposes of IRPJ 
iii. Intangible assets related to technological activities would be fully amor-
tized in the year of purchase, but also only for IRPJ purposes.
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In addition to these new incentives related to the tax base for IRPJ and CSLL, 
the Lei do Bem included other mechanisms, such as:
• 50% reduction of IPI (Tax on Manufactured Products) for capital goods to 
be used for innovation;
• IRPJ tax credit of 20% on international remittances related to royalties 
and technical assistance for expenditure up to December 2008, and 10% 
for expenses incurred after this date 
• Elimination of taxes levied on international consignments relating to 
patent and trademark registrations; and
• Subsidy of 40% of the payroll of full-time researchers - this subsidy can 
reach 60% for companies located in the North and Northeast regions 
In 2008 there was a revision of the Lei do Bem, and the main change occurred 
in the rule of depreciation. From that year on, the companies were able to fully 
depreciate in the year in which the investments in machinery and equipment for 
technological development were made, and this permission became applicable also 
to the CSLL.
The law defines innovation based on the Oslo Manual concept, but the defi-
nition of expenditure on innovation is very broadly. It includes not only in-house 
R&D, but also contracted R&D by companies and universities, as well as royalties 
and technical assistance expenses.
The Lei do Bem incentives, global in character, do not have incremental rules 
or incentives. The result of the changes introduced by the Lei do Bem was that more 
firms started to use innovation tax incentive mechanisms in Brazil.
However, considering that there are around six thousand companies with R&D 
activities in Brazil and that only 1,205 accessed Lei do Bem incentives in 2015, there is 
a great potential for the use of these incentives in Brazil, as they become more widely 
known and effective. Besides, we could observe that there was no precise criticism 
of the Lei do Bem. This means the Lei do Bem supports only product innovations, 
processes, and services (technological innovations), not considering organizational 
and marketing innovations. The Lei do Bem doesn't make satisfactory differentiation 
between radical and incremental innovations which may be a serious problem for 
developing countries, such as Brazil.
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METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the tax incentives of the Lei do Bem, we based the methodology of this 
study on the Principal-Agent model, as presented above.
In the scope of innovation, incentives to agents can be of the most diverse sort; 
for example, tax exemptions or subsidies, depending on the type of activity that the 
law regulates. Table 1 shows the main tax incentives for R&D activities, defined based 
on the Frascati Manual of developed countries: Canada, the United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom. In the Table, we can see the potential of the innovation 
support instrument known as a tax incentive, as countries with a high technological 
base exempt companies that invest in R&D from more taxes.
Concerning the Lei do Bem, there are countless incentives and stimuli for 
innovation: i) additional deduction of 60% of Legal Entity Income Tax (IRPJ); ii) de-
duction of 20% for a patent granted; iii) full depreciation in the year of acquisition 
of equipment and accelerated amortization for intangible assets; iv) reduction of IPI 
of up to 50% in the acquisition of equipment. Given these incentives, the agents can 
make a specific level of effort, low or high, and this decision impacts the final result. 
In addition, the agent is still subject to random factors, which can positively (good 
luck) or negatively (bad luck) influence the outcome.
In the context of the Lei do Bem, companies, and industries are seen as "Agent" 
and the government is seen as “Principal”. Since the law has specific points to be 
fulfilled by the Agents, then there is a Principal-Agent problem with covert actions. 
This hypothesis is based on the observation that, even with all the inspection care 
that can be taken in the company's innovation department, he does not monitor at 
all times, and therefore, it is up to the Agent to decide whether to follow the rules 
laid down by law in full or in part.
 Presenting different objectives within the principal-agent system, the pro-
blem is limited to the tax reward structure that the government proposes to the 
company. The government (Principal) wants an effective law that fulfills its purpose, 
which depends on the "effort" made by the company in the innovation sector, as 
well as on random factors (states of nature) such as economic crisis, technological 
change, etc. We know that companies and industries also present sectorial factors 
such as changes in production chains, the establishment of market power, etc. 
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Table 1.
Research and Development Incentive Policies
Countries Access Benefit Limits Benefitiaries Observations
Canada Government Approval
35% refundable tax 






Tax credit valid for use for 
up to 20 years.
20% non-refundable tax 
credit for large companies.
Expenses may be 
accumulated for a period 




Tax credit of 20% of 






Companies must meet a 
preliminary test (4 part 
Test).
14% Simple Alternative 
Credit for Qualified 
Research Expenditures - 
QREs minus 50% of the 
average research for the 
last three fiscal years.
France Automatic
Tax credit of 40% of 






Accountability to be 
delivered by 3 months and 
15 days following the end 
of the fiscal year.
35% tax credit in the 
second year of the benefit
Coming years, tax credit 
of 30% of expenses up to 
100 million euros, and 5% 




Deduction of 225% 






The time limit for using the 
benefits is up to two years 
after the end of the fiscal 
year.
130% deduction for large 
companies;
Patent Box to reduce your 
Corporation Tax on profits8
Source: Prepared by the author based on Barbosa et al. (2013).
8 See more: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-the-patent-box
416
Revista Finanzas y Politíca Económica, Vol. 13, N.° 2, julio-diciembre, 2021, pp. 403-437
Felippe Clemente 
However, for this research, we consider only random factors of macroeconomic 
origin, given the national scope of the database used. In addition, it is considered as 
a proxy for the effort expected by the government to file patents by companies that 
accessed the Lei do Bem in the period from 2006 to 2015.9
Thus, the timing of the game follows: the government promulgates a certain 
law, in this case, the Lei do Bem and discloses to companies that undertake inno-
vation and R&D. Each company then decides whether or not to participate in the 
law and decides whether to make a certain level of effort, in which case, to record 
innovation achieved through filing patents. Finally, they observe the state of nature, 
and so verify the equilibrium reached.
To facilitate visualization, in general, it is possible to enumerate the steps 
followed in the methodology:
i. Firstly, we analysed the Lei do Bem to verify at which points moral hazard 
may occur and where there is no economic incentive;
ii. After that, we designed simulations of possible games, using Lei do Bem 
incentives to innovation, taking into account the states of nature (good/
bad luck), which can influence its outcome positively or negatively
iii. Subsequently, we obtained the solution of the game using the perfect 
equilibrium in subgame, that is, solving the game from back to front;
iv. Finally, it analyses whether the Lei do Bem is free or not of the problem 
of moral hazard.
Source of the data and variables
We collected data from several sources: i) the financial volume renounced by the 
government for the benefit of Brazilian companies, the Lei do Bem reports from 
2006 to 2015, published by the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
(MCTI); ii) to select the companies that accessed the tax benefits in the period 
from 2006 to 2015 the annex of the Lei do Bem reports, which contain the National 
Register of Corporate Taxpayers Number (CNPJ) of the participating companies; 
9 Several studies justify the proxy that analyses the impact of patent costs on innovation. The report of the 
European Commission for Innovation "Patent costs and impact on innovation" for the year 2016 contributes 
a complete survey on studies relating to patents and innovation. However, patent data as an ST&I indicator 
has some limitations developed in the literature (KANNEBLEY JÚNIOR et al, 2016; BLIND et al, 2018).
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and iii) to extract the patent filings of the companies benefited by the Lei do Bem on 
the public database of the National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI).
The variables used in the simulations of the Principal-Agent model for the 
different Brazilian regions follow on Table 2:
Table 2.
Variables and parameters used in the simulations
Variables Parameters
Company investment – high effort/good luck10 4.4 x incentives granted
Company investment – high effort/bad luck11 3.83 x incentives granted
Company investment– low effort/good luck 4.4 x incentives granted
Company investment– low effort/bad luck 3.83 x incentives granted
Government social cost Value of waived taxes
Cost of filing patents in Brazil 12 R$ 33,463.10.13
Companies’ utility reserve R$ 0
Incentives for filing patents – SE R$ 5,268,453.42
Incentives for filing patents – S R$    974,091.11
Incentives for filing patents – NE R$      24,211.11
Source: Author's elaboration.
RESULTS
To evaluate the companies that accessed the Lei do Bem, as well as the patent filings, 
made,14 we carried out a descriptive analysis and, afterward, simulations with the 
Principal-Agent model.
Descriptive analysis
For the period between 2006 and 2015, companies accessed the Lei do Bem 5,932 
times, in the form of tax incentives. In total, 2,021 companies received innovation 
10 Multiplier effect of tax incentives to innovation. That is, every 1 real in incentives, companies invest 4.4 reais. 
Information available at: ANPEI, 2017.
11 Decline in investments in approximately 13% for periods of crisis, according to data from the Annual Industrial 
Survey of Companies (PIA-Empresas) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 2015.
12 See Kagan Binder, PLLC, 2004.
13 Cost in dollars: $10,490 and the dollar exchange rate for July 14, 2017: R$3.19.
14 Patent data as an ST&I indicator has some limitations developed in the literature (KANNEBLEY JÚNIOR et 
al, 2016; BLIND et al, 2018).
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benefits and accessed the law to obtain such incentives, on average, 2.54 times. Given 
the geographical, economic, and industrial diversity of Brazil, we carried out a spe-
cific analysis to ascertain access to tax incentives by companies from all regions of 
Brazil. In this research, we disregarded the sectorial question because there was no 
available patent bank in Brazil distributed according to the productive sector. The 
Southeast region (1,225 companies) concentrates the largest number of companies 
that have obtained tax incentives for innovation through the Lei do Bem, followed 
by the South (652), Northeast (97), Midwest (38), and North (9). There is a strong 
concentration of beneficiary companies located in the South and Southeast regions 
(92.87%) and an inexpressible share of the North region (0.045%).
For the number of accesses15 to the Lei do Bem, we have: the Southeast region 
with 3,545 direct accesses to tax incentives; the South region with 1,976 accesses; the 
Northeast region with 212; the Midwest region with 83 and the North region with 
27 accesses. Once again, there is a strong concentration of accesses in the South and 
Southeast regions of Brazil (95% of the total). Table 3 shows the average, by state, 
of accesses to the Lei do Bem by the beneficiary companies.
Table 3.
Average number of accesses, by State, to the Lei do Bem by companies  
in the period from 2006 to 2015
South Northeast North
RS 3.33 MA 4.00 AM 0.00
SC 2.81 PI 0.00 AC 0.00
PR 2.64 CE 2.21 RR 0.00
Southeast BA 2.16 RO 1.00
SP 2.91 RN 0.00 PA 2.80
RJ 2.71 PB 2.40 AP 0.00
MG 2.94 PE 2.13
ES 3.82 AL 0.00
Midwest SE 2.33
GO 2.14 TO 2.50
MT 2.20
MS 1.50
DF 2.40     
Source: Author's elaboration.
15 The number of accesses is the number of years that companies have accessed the Lei do Bem to receive tax 
incentives for innovation. If, for example, a company accessed each year the law throughout the period analyzed 
(2006-2015) then we counted nine times.
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When verifying the number of patents filed by companies benefiting from the 
Lei do Bem, there is a significant reduction in numbers. In total, 489 companies filed 
an innovation patent in the period from 2006 to 2015 in the INPI patent bank, that 
is, only 24% of the total number of companies that received tax incentives in the 
same period patented some product or process innovation. According to Figure 2, 
the State of São Paulo had the largest number of companies that filed patents (215 
in total) and had the highest number of accesses to the Lei do Bem (827 in total). 
The state with the second-largest number of companies was the Rio Grande do Sul, 
with 100 filings and 424 accesses. We can see that in general the largest concentra-
tion of filing companies that accessed the Lei do Bem is in the South and Southeast 
regions of Brazil.
For the other regions, most companies that accessed tax incentives did not file 
patents during the period studied. In the Midwest, only companies from the Federal 
District filed patents in the INPI database. In the Northeast, companies from the 
states of Ceará, Bahia, and Pernambuco filed some type of innovation patent; and 
for the North region, no company benefitting from Lei do Bem registered patents in 
the period analyzed (Table 4).
Figure 2. Number of companies benefited by the Lei do Bem that filed patents and the 
number of accesses, in years - 2006 to 2015, according to State.













Quan�dade de acesso (anos) Número de Empresas
Source: Author's elaboration.
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Table 4.
Average of patent filings, by State, by companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem in the 
period from 2006 to 2015
South Northeast North
RS 4.24 MA 0.00 AM 0.00
SC 3.73 PI 0.00 AC 0.00
PR 3.38 CE 8.00 RR 0.00
Southeast BA 3.67 RO 0.00
SP 3.85 RN 0.00 PA 0.00
RJ 3.20 PB 4.00 AP 0.00
MG 3.51 PE 3.75
ES 2.67 AL 0.00
Midwest SE 0.00
GO 0.00 TO 0.00
MT 0.00
MS 0.00
DF 5.00     
Source: Author's elaboration.
In this context, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) compa-
red the number of patents filed and the degree of innovation of a country and found 
that there is a strong positive correlation between the two variables. In addition, the 
publication showed that the number of valid patents in Brazil is behind countries 
considered a reference in innovation. The survey uses data from 2012 and places 
the United States first, with 2.2 million patents, followed by Japan, which has 1.6 
million. Then China (875,000), South Korea (738,000), Germany (549,000), France 
(490,000), and the United Kingdom (459,000). Brazil ranked 19th with 41,453 valid 
patents. In the BRICS bloc, all are superior in patent filing: following China are Russia 
(181,000), South Africa (112,000), and India (42,991) (WIPO, 2014).
Figure 3 shows the information on the number of patents filed according to the 
State. In total, we filed 4,857 patents with INPI between 2006 and 2015 by compa-
nies benefiting from the Lei do Bem. The State of São Paulo had the largest number 
of filings (2,397 in total), representing 49.35% of patents filed at the national level. 
The second State with the highest number of patents was Rio Grande do Sul (RS), 
with 829 patents (17.06%). The other Brazilian States deposited 1,631 patents or 
33.58% of the total, in the period analyzed.
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When comparing the regions (Table 5) the concentration in issuance and in-
novation patent or process filings becomes even more evident. The Southeast region 
deposited a total of 3,166 patents in the period from 2006 to 2015, or 64.15% of 
the national total. The South region deposited 1,489 patents or 30.65% of the total. 
Together, they account for 94.8% of the total patents of companies benefitting from 
the Lei do Bem.
Table 5.
Patent filings, according to Region, by companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem in the 








 Source: Author's elaboration.
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Table 6 summarizes the information discussed so far. In general, we can see 
that the companies benefiting from the Lei do Bem performed innovations of pro-
ducts and processes in the form of patents filed. However, the number of companies 
benefitting, the number of accesses, and the patents were concentrated in regions 
which, before Lei do Bem, had traditionally been innovating. The companies located 
in the regions that should benefit most from the tax exemptions to innovate, namely 
the North, Northeast, and Midwest, almost did not access the Lei do Bem and so they 
did not file patents, which evidences the needs for changes to the law so that it can 
better serve those regions.
Table 6. 
Number of companies benefited by the Lei do Bem, number of accesses and patent filings, 
State, from 2006 to 2015
RS SC PR SP RJ MG
Number of Companies 100 41 40 215 35 41
Quantity of acesses (years) 424 153 135 827 112 144
Patents Filed 829 264 396 2397 397 305
DF CE BA PB PE ES
Number of Companies 2 1 6 1 4 3
Quantity of acesses (years) 10 8 22 4 15 8
Patents Filed 11 81 127 3 30 17
 Source: Author's elaboration.
Regarding the total value of the tax benefits granted to companies that ac-
cessed the Lei do Bem from 2006 to 2015 (Table 7), we highlight that the Southeast 
region concentrates a large part of the tax exemption related to innovation activities 
(80.10%), followed by the South region (14.37%). In addition, almost all of the re-
sources allocated to incentives for patent deposits went to the States of São Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo (84.06%). The South region received 
15.54% of incentives to file patents or registrations and the Northeast only 0.0038%.
Application of the principal-agent model without incentives
The applied Principal-Agent model is restricted to companies that have accessed 
the Lei do Bem from 2006 to 2015. The government, which grants the tax benefits, is 
interested in the company promoting product or process innovation to increase its 
competitiveness and increase its productivity, in addition to filing patents with the 
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INPI patent bank. However, for this to be possible, the benefitting company (Agent) 
needs to make efforts in the innovative process and to be "lucky", that is, it depends on 
the effort made by the companies as well as random (states of nature) and structural 
factors, such as economic performance. As the Agent seeks to maximize its utility, it is 
only willing to act according to what the Principal establishes if there are incentives 
in the execution of the activities. A simplifying hypothesis is to establish two levels 
of effort: the company benefitting from the Lei do Bem can choose between making 
high or low effort to promote innovation in the industry. In addition, we have the 
value known as utility reserve, which is independent of the effort of the company to 
follow the recommendations in innovation. Therefore, the utility of the company to 
consider is 0, as there is no tax exemption for companies that do not access Lei do Bem. 
To determine whether or not to access the Lei do Bem, the company will compare the 
gains and its utility reserves, that is, what it earns if it does not access tax incentives.
Table 7.
Tax benefits and incentives for patents granted to companies that accessed the Lei do Bem, 
according to Region, from 2006 to 2015
Tax Benefits Incentive per Patent/Registration
North  R$        31,420,803.44  R$            -   
Northeast  R$        31,552,965.35  R$   24,211.11 
Midwest  R$          7,902,337.02  R$            -   
Southeast  R$   1,027,710,238.81  R$   5,268,453.42 
South  R$      184,405,811.81  R$   974,091.11 
 Source: Author's elaboration.
For companies that access the Lei do Bem and promote the high effort, that 
is, innovate and also file patents with the INPI patent bank, the multiplier effect of 
incentives to innovation is considered as 4.4,16 that is, for each 1 real in incentive, 
companies invest 4.4 reais. This occurs in the case of the phenomena of nature 
being favourable, given the agent's effort. Thus, the hypothesis is that, with effort, 
the company will obtain the total tax exemption and, through the multiplier effect, 
will have its revenue. Profit is obtained by deducting the cost of filing patents from 
the revenue.17 In this hypothesis, it is deemed that, with luck, about 87%18 of the 
16 Data from the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Trade (MCTIC).
17 See: Kagan Binder, PLLC, 2004.
18 Data from the Annual Industrial Survey of Companies (PIA-Empresas) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE), fall in investments in times of crisis of approximately 13%, 2015.
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volume invested can be realized for the two levels of effort chosen. In other words, 
it considers a 13% drop in the multiplier effect of fiscal incentives for periods of 
economic downturn. With "luck", we work with an optimistic view that 100% of 
the multiplier effect is applied to the volume of incentives granted to companies.
To facilitate the analysis, we prepared the games taking into account the cha-
racteristics of each Brazilian region. Thus, Figure 5 represents the game tree for the 
Southeast region, which indicates the possible actions of the Company (Agent) and 
Government (Principal), and the payoffs, results in financial terms for both.
If companies in the Southeast region choose to make a high effort (action a1, node 
t3) and are lucky (action s, node t4), revenue will be 100% materialized in fixed assets, 
totaling R$ 4,521,925,050.76.19 As in the high effort, the company performs innovation 
and files the patent, the costs of maintenance of the patents are debited in public agencies 
(National Institute of Industrial Property – INPI). Given that companies in the Southeast 
region that accessed the Lei do Bem filed 3,116 patents in the period from 2006 to 2015 
and that the cost of maintaining a patent in Brazil is R$ 33.463,10,20 it is estimated that 
the cost of patents for the Southeast region is R $ 104,271,019.60. Subtracting these costs 
from corporate revenues, we have a net value of R$ 4,417,654,031.16. In this ramification 
of the game, the government has a social cost with companies for R$ 923,439,219.20, 
which corresponds to the number of tax incentives granted to companies in the region 
in the period from 2006 to 2015 (R$ 1,027,710,238.81) subtracted from the value of the 
patent filed by the companies to the public agency (R$ 104,271,019.60). If companies 
apply a lot of effort but have bad luck, they will receive revenue of 87% of the tax benefits 
fixed assets. Therefore, this amount will correspond to R$ 3,934,074,794.00. Subtracting 
the cost of patent deposits (R$ 104,271,019.60), the companies will have a net revenue 
of R$ 3,829,803,774.00. The social cost of government remains the same in this part 
of the game, as tax exemptions are granted regardless of the economic performance of 
companies. Considering now that the companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem apply 
low effort, that is, innovate, but do not file patents with INPI, and they are lucky,21 they 
will have revenue of R$ 4,521,925,050.76 without deduction of any cost because there 
is no patent issued. In this case, the social cost of the government will be identical to the 
tax exemptions granted to companies in the Southeast, or R$ 1,027,710,238.81. Similarly, 
when companies apply low effort and have bad luck, the actual revenue is 87%, which 
produces a profit of R$ 3,934,074,794.00 without deduction of the cost of patents, 
19 The multiplier effect of 4.4 multiplied by the total tax incentives in the Southeast region (R$1,027,710,238.81)
20 Cost in dollars: $10,490 and the dollar exchange rate for July 14, 2017: R$3.19
21 Considering the multiplier of 4.4.
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since they have not been filed. The social cost of government remains the same for the 
case of low effort because the tax benefit does not depend on the economic performance 
of the sectors to be released. 
In this way, the solution to the game can be found using perfect subgame equi-
librium, that is, solving by reverse induction. Substituting the last lottery of Figure 4, 
corresponding to the possible states of nature, by their expected values, we move to 
node t3, where the companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem will decide between 
the two possible actions to be performed: high or low effort.
Figure 4. Principal-Agent game without incentives for patents involving companies  
in the Southeast region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government 
  R$ 3.829.803.774,00 (Company) 
- R$ 923.439.219,20    (Government) 
  R$ 4.417.654.031,16  (Company) 



















  R$ 4.521.925.050,76   (Company) 
- R$ 1.027.710.238,81   (Government)  N 
s 
a   R$ 3.934.074.794,00 (Company) - R$ 1.027.710.238,81 (Government) 






At this point, companies compare the expected utilities for the two cases, analyzing 
the difference in revenue of the two alternatives, and thus decide the level of effort they 
will employ, i.e., which maximizes utility. In fact, companies will buy the utility provided 
by the two possible actions they can take, given the two expected revenues according 
to the states of nature and their respective efforts, that is, they compare the utility of 
applying high effort, u(p(s) * 4,417,654,031.16 + p(a) * 3,829,803,774.00, a1), with the 
utility of applying low effort, u(p(s) * 4,521,925,050.76 + p(a) * 3,934,074,794.00, a2). The 
companies will decide to apply high effort, that is, they will file patents, if they attribute 
to the difference of effort a value less than or equal to the difference between the proce-
eds of applying such efforts. Revenues, in turn, will depend directly on the probability 
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of each of the states of nature. In this case, in the best scenario, if companies are lucky 
with a 100% chance (p(s) = 1), the difference between applying high and low effort is 
-R$ 104,271,019.60, which represents a significant value for companies in the Southeast 
region. Thus, the choice of the application of low effort becomes justifiable, since the 
companies do not receive tax exemption for the effort expended, that is, to file patents.
After deciding on low effort, companies move to node t2 where they will decide 
whether to accept or reject the government's tax incentive proposal. They will accept it 
only if the expected utility of the chosen action is greater than or equal to the expected 
utility of the other possible options, that is, the level of companies’ utility reserve, res-
pecting the restriction of participation. The companies receive nothing (ū = 0) in terms 
of utility reserve if they refuse to participate in the system of tax benefits proposed by 
the Lei do Bem. With this income, in t2, following the theoretical model, companies accept 
access to tax benefits as, in the worst case, the profit, with the Lei do Bem, for the state 
of nature of bad luck is R$ 3,934,074,794.00, which is much higher than the value of the 
utility reserve stipulated in this study. In t1, the government chooses to promulgate the 
instrument to incentive innovation, in this case, the Lei do Bem, or otherwise.
The question is whether the enacted law is appropriate for each of the types 
of innovative companies. Thus we see the differences in gains (or social cost) of the 
government for each state of nature. If the state is "lucky", the government can benefit 
R$ 104,271,019.61 should the companies apply high effort. The same value occurs 
for the "bad luck" state. This value corresponds to how much the government or 
innovation incentive bodies could pay more for the effort of companies to innovate 
and patent the innovation.
Figure 5 shows the "payoffs" of the companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem 
and the government of the South region of Brazil. In the period from 2006 to 2015, 1,489 
patents were filed with the INPI patent bank by companies located in the states of Rio 
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná. Given that the cost of maintaining patents in 
Brazil, according to Kagan Binder (2004), is R$ 33,463.10, we estimated that the total 
cost of patents in the South region is R$ 184,405,811.81. We debited this amount from 
corporate revenue in the event of high effort, either "luck" or "bad luck" and credited to 
government accounts, also in the two states of nature. In the case of low effort by compa-
nies benefiting from tax incentives, we considered only the amounts of tax exemptions.
Thus, in solving the game using reverse induction, the model encouraged 
companies to exercise low effort in the domain of innovation/patent registration, 
considering the high cost of maintaining these registrations. It was found that 
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companies agree to participate in the Lei do Bem, but do not receive any other in-
centive or premium to register patents arising from the innovation made. The same 
result is shown for Figures 6 and 7, which show values for the Midwest (total patent 
cost R$ 368,094.10) and Northeast (total patent cost R$ 8,064,607.10), respectively.
Figure 5. Principal-Agent game without incentives for patents involving companies  
in the South region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government
  R$ 521.499.635,80 (Company) 
- R$ 134.579.255,91 (Government) 
  R$ 761.559.016,06 (Company) 



















  R$ 811.385.571,96 (Company) 
- R$ 184.405.811,81 (Government) 
 
 N s 
a   R$ 705.905.447,60 (Company) - R$ 184.405.811,81 (Government) 






Figure 6. Principal-Agent game without incentives for patents involving companies in the 
Midwest region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government 
  R$ 29.882.052,01  (Company) 
- R$ 7.534.242,92    (Government) 
  R$ 34.402.188,78 (Company) 



















  R$ 34.770.282,88 (Company) 
- R$ 7.902.337,02  (Government)  N 
s 
a   R$ 30.250.146,11  (Company) - R$ 7.902.337,02    (Government) 
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Figure 7. Principal-Agent game without incentives for patents involving companies in the 
Northeast region benefiting from the Lei do Bem and government 
 
  R$ 112.720.144,20  (Company) 
- R$ 23.488.357,90    (Government) 
  R$ 130.768.440,44  (Company) 



















  R$ 138.833.047,54  (Company) 
- R$ 31.552.965,35  (Government)  N 
s 
a   R$ 120.784.751,30   (Company) - R$ 31.552.357,90     (Government) 






For the Northern region (Figure 8), corporate and government "payoffs" are the 
same for both high and low effort. This is because, in the period from 2006 to 2015, no 
patent was filed with INPI from companies located in the northern region of Brazil. In 
this case, we considered only the ramification of the game indicating low effort, evi-
dencing the same path travelled by companies in the north. That is, companies agree 
to participate in the tax benefits granted by the Lei do Bem, but they are not stimulated 
or encouraged to expend high effort in registering and maintaining patents.
Figure 8. Principal-Agent game without incentives for patents involving companies in the 
North region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government 
 
  R$ 120.279.037,70  (Company) 
- R$ 31.420.803,44    (Government) 
  R$ 138.251.535,13  (Company) 



















  R$ 138.251.767,56  (Company) 
- R$ 31.420.803,44    (Government) 
 
 N s 
a   R$ 120.279.037,70   (Company) - R$ 31.420.803,44     (Government) 
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In general, we can see that companies, in all regions in Brazil, make a low 
effort when considering innovation involving the registration of marks and patents. 
Once again, we can see that the high cost of maintaining patents with public agencies 
makes it difficult for companies to make their innovations available in the database. 
For policymakers, it is important to highlight the need for some efficient mechanism 
in the Lei do Bem to encourage the publication of patents, to encourage companies 
to patent their innovation activities.
Given the application, we can observe that the incentives contained in the Lei 
do Bem and proposed by the government do not encourage companies to make a high 
effort, i.e. innovate and register patents in the INPI database. We noted an advantage 
for companies to access the Lei do Bem to benefit from tax incentives, as they always 
get more than the utility reserve. However, the law does not have mechanisms that 
encourage companies to make a high effort. What happens is that the cost of patents 
and their maintenance is much higher than that in developing countries. According 
to Kagan Binder (2004), patent costs in Brazil amount to $10,490.00. This value 
resembles the values  of developed countries such as France ($ 11,750.00), Spain ($ 
12,335.00), and Italy ($ 12,970.00). Other developed countries have lower costs than 
Brazil, such as the United States ($ 8,550.00) and Canada ($ 7,255.00). Developing 
countries have much lower costs because they have the purpose of encouraging 
innovation in their territory, which is still incipient. South Africa ($ 2375.00) and 
New Zealand ($ 2105.00) are countries with low costs in filing patents, encouraging 
companies to register their innovations.
It is worth mentioning that the 87% percentage stipulated for the fall in eco-
nomic performance, with the "bad luck" state of nature, may have been undersized, 
or that the revenues stipulated when a high effort is made have been unrealistic. 
However, the need for real incentives for companies to register innovations is evident.
Application of the principal-agent model with incentives
The analysis of this section concerns the investigation of the incentive mechanism 
in the Lei do Bem for filing/registering patents in the INPI database. According to 
Table 7, from 2006 to 2015, some Brazilian regions received incentives for patent 
registrations. Thus, we considered these incentives on Figures 9, 10, and 11 for the 
Southeast, South, and Northeast regions, respectively. For all three regions, the pa-
yoffs of companies increased if they proposed to make a high effort. However, due to 
the negligible value granted by public agencies to companies that have filed patents, 
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the retroactive solution of the games indicates that it is still more advantageous to 
make a low effort on the part of companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem in the 
regions analysed.
Thus, for incentives to exert a stimulus on companies to make a high effort, 
the government must reimpose the granting of tax benefits, giving more emphasis 
to incentives that include the registration and filing of patents. For the Southeast 
region, considering the "luck" state of nature, the incentives for patent filing should 
be at least R$ 99,002,566.18 for companies to make a high effort and record their 
innovations in the INPI database. For the South region, with the same state of nature, 
the necessary incentives for the choice of high effort by the beneficiary companies 
are of the order of at least R$ 48,852,464.79. For the Northeast region, this amount 
must be at least R$ 8,040,395.99. With these incentives to register/file patents, 
companies in these regions would be encouraged to make high efforts and register 
patents in public agencies responsible for innovation in Brazil. For the government, 
this kind of tax exemption would be more interesting, since part of the benefit re-
turns to the public sector in the form of annuities and patent filing fees, in addition, 
to show, more transparently and accurately, how the Brazilian innovation system 
has improved and evolved.
Figure 9. Principal-Agent game with incentives for patents involving companies in the 
Southeast region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government 
 
  R$ 3.835.072.227,00 (Company) 
- R$ 928.707.672,62    (Government) 
  R$ 4.422.922.484,58 (Company) 



















  R$ 4.521.925.050,76 (Company) 
- R$ 1.027.710.238,81   (Government) 
 
 N s 
a   R$ 3.934.074.794,00 (Company) - R$ 1.027.710.238,81 (Government) 
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Figure 10. Principal-Agent game with incentives for patents involving companies in the 
South region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government 
 
  R$ 522.473.726,90 (Company) 
- R$ 135.553.347,02 (Government) 
  R$ 762.533.107,17 (Company) 



















  R$ 811.385.571,96 (Company) 
- R$ 184.405.811,81 (Government) 
 
 N s 
a   R$ 705.905.447,60 (Company) - R$ 184.405.811,81 (Government) 
 






Figure 11. Principal-Agent game with incentives for patents involving companies in the 
Northeast region benefitting from the Lei do Bem and government
 
  R$ 112.744.355,30  (Company) 
- R$ 23.512.569,01    (Government) 
  R$ 130.792.651,55  (Company) 



















  R$ 138.833.047,54  (Company) 
- R$ 31.552.965,35  (Government) 
 
 N s 
a   R$ 120.784.751,30   (Company) - R$ 31.552.357,90     (Government) 
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CONCLUSIONS
This study found empirical results on the moral hazard in the Brazilian system of 
innovations, specifically the Lei do Bem. We emphasized as main results the low effort 
made by companies benefitting from the tax exemptions of the Lei do Bem and the 
lack of effective incentive for companies to file patents and maintain their innovations 
in the INPI database. Other significant result is that, even with the incentive granted 
by the government to companies in the Southeast, South, and Northeast for patents, 
it is still rational for companies in these regions to make low innovation efforts. This 
can lead to a discussion how the public decision makers should effectively moni-
tor companies, based on proxies that objectively present the level of effort of the 
agent.  In this sense, creating mechanisms in the Lei do Bem that value innovative 
companies more which patent more products can be a good way of revealing the 
real effort of the agent (companies) in relation to what is proposed by the principal 
(government). Another way can come through support and tax incentives for the 
post-patent period, in which the new product and/or technology need to expand in 
scale until reaching final consumers.
However, it is necessary to consider that the linked incentive related to the 
filing of a patent is also a spasmodic response to a more complex problem, related to 
the low innovative activity in Brazil, which in the last few years has been undergoing 
in a process of deindustrialization. In this line, rethink another national plan for 
growth taking into account all Brazilian industries and their capacity to produce new 
technologies is essential and as important as new measures that increase incentives 
to patent products. Patents are the end product of an innovation chain and come as 
a consequence of a good and structured industrial policy.
The article contributes to the literature because it is the first empirical study 
that uses data from reports about companies benefitting from the Lei do Bem provided 
by the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MCTI) and the patents filed 
by these companies in the database of the National Institute of Intellectual Property 
(INPI) in the period in which the Law has been in effect. This fills, in part, the gaps 
in the practical field for studies dealing with innovation in Brazil.
One of the limitations of this study may be the fact of taking into account 
underestimated simulations for the cases of economic performance and also of the 
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efforts made by the companies. Although the information is limited, improving the 
percentages of the scenarios.
Given this evidence, it is worth discussing ways to improve tax incentives. As 
knowledge of incentives increases and gains in expertise in obtaining them increase, 
it is important to pay attention to intensifying their use. In addition, it is necessary 
to think about future changes in the law to preserve the incentive as its returns 
diminish. As a suggestion, it is important to think about utilization rules based on 
the increment in R&D expenditures, instead of the tax exemption based on the total 
expenditures made, or variations in the determinants of the cost of capital use. That 
is, always discuss improvement alternatives to avoid its exhaustion.
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